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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction in this appeal is properly reposed in the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (e), as an appeal from a court of record not involving a first degree
or capital felony.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
I.

Was the failure of the trial court to instruct the jury that a combination of
physical conduct, or actus reus, and a culpable mental state, or mens rea,
was necessary to convict Geukgeuzian of the crimes charged manifest
error?
i. Standard of Review. Plain Error, Rule 19 (c), Utah R. Crim. P.,
American Fork v. Carr 970 P. 2d 717 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
ii. Preservation of Issue. Where a jury instruction was not objected to at
trial, appellate review is still possible in regards to issues of manifest
injustice.

II.

Was the failure of the trial court to instruct the jury concerning the
requisite mental state necessary to convict Geukgeuzian for the two
offenses charged was tantamount to a failure to give a necessary elements
instruction and therefore manifest injustice as a matter of law.
i. Standard of Review. Plain Error, Rule 19 (c), Utah R. Crim. P., State
v. Gibson 908 P. 2d 352 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). American Fork v. Carr
970 P. 2d 717 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
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ii. Preservation of Issue. Where a jury instruction was not objected to at
trial, appellate review is still possible in regards to issues of manifest
injustice.
Was the trial court's failure to instruct the jury concerning the statutory
definition of "knowing," as it applies to False Written Statements a failure
to give a necessary elements instruction and therefore manifest injustice as
a matter of law.
i. Standard of Review. Plain Error, Rule 19 (c), Utah R. Crim. P.,
American Fork v. Carr 970 P. 2d 717 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
ii. Preservation of Issue. Where a jury instruction was not objected to at
trial, appellate review is still possible in regards to issues of manifest
injustice.
Did trial counsel's failure to object to the question directed to Lyons
asking if Appellant btew that Lyon had heard him make threats against his
estranged wife, operate to deny Appellant effective assistance of counsel
guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of United States
Constitution?
i. Standard of Review. Reversible Error, State v. Verde 770 P. 2d 116
(Utah 1989).
ii. Preservation of Issue. Where a jury instruction was not objected to at
trial, appellate review is still possible in regards to issues of manifest
injustice.
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES
The following statutes are determinative of the issues or portion thereof addressed in the
respective briefs of the parties. The text of the statutes is presented in its entirety in the
Addendum.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-504
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508
Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature, Proceedings and Disposition Below.
This appeal is from a final judgment of the Second District Court in and for Davis

County, Utah, convicting Defendant/Appellant of Witness Tampering and Written False
Statements in an order styled Minutes, Sentence, Judgment, Commitment and dated February 7,
2001.
B.

Statement of Facts.
1.

In May of 2000, Appellant, at the urging of his attorney, approached several co-

workers at Hill Air Force Base, and requested that they write a statement on Appellant's behalf
in conjunction with an ex-parte protective order Geukgeuzian's estranged wife had filed. One
such co-worker was Airman Jason Lyon ("Lyon"). (Appellate Record, hereinafter R., 00141:
99.)
2.

Appellant asked Lyon to include in his statement whether Appellant had made

threats against his estranged wife. (R. 00141: 120-25.)
3.

Unbeknownst to Appellant, Lyon had, approximately one week before, provided a

written statement to the Office of Special Investigations ("OSI") of Hill Air Force Base wherein
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he stated, among other things, that he had overheard Appellant make threats or speak
threateningly against his estranged wife. (R. 00141: 25-29.)
4.

Lyon testified that at no time did Appellant make any verbal or physical threats

towards him nor did Appellant promise Lyon anything to induce him to write the statement. (R.
00141:56.)
5.

Lyon agreed to write a statement on behalf of Appellant without voicing any

objection whatsoever. Subsequently, Lyon wrote a statement while he was alone at his
dormitory. He later gave the statement to Appellant. (R. 00141: 33-34.)
6.

Lyon at no time told Appellant (1) about the OSI investigation; (2) that Lyon had

previously provided a written statement to OSI; (3) that the statement which he had given to OSI
was contrary to the statement he had given to Appellant; or (4) that Lyon did not believe what he
had written. (R. 00141: 123-25.)
7.

Lyon did not inform his superior officers or any member of OSI that Appellant

had asked for, and that he had provided him, a wTitten statement. (R. 00141: 42-43, 46.)
8.

Appellant provided Lyon's written statement to his attorney Pete Vlahos who

subsequently submitted the same to the Second District Court in a protective order hearing. (R.
00141:100.)
9.

Lyon pleaded guilty to giving a false written statement, a Class B Misdemeanor in

exchange for his agreement to testify against Appellant. (R. 00141: 51-52.)
10.

Defense counsel at trial, Richard J. Culbertson, failed to object to a line of

questioning between the State's attorney and Lyon wherein Lyon testified as to the personal
knowledge and state of mind of defendant. (R. 00141: 31.)
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11.

Culbertson passed, without objection, the jury instructions which were ultimately

given to the jury. (R. 00048-00069; R. 00141: 135-142.)

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I.

The requisite mental state is an element of the crimes charged and the court must

instruct the jury with regard to the requisite mental state.
a.

Given the critical nature of applying a proper mental state during jury

deliberations, Appellant suffered manifest injustice when the trial court failed to instruct the jury
as to the mental state required of the Appellant to sustain a conviction for tampering with a
witness.
b. The Trial Court committed reversible Error when it misstated the law with
regard to the mental state required to be found guilty of false written statement and failed to
define the mental state of "knowing."
II.

Appellant was denied affective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the United

States Constitution when trial counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness.
a.

Trial counsel's failure to object to the jury instructions that were obviously

flawed in regard to critical elements of the crimes charged constituted ineffective assistance of
counsel.
b.

Where the essence of Appellant's defense was his lack of knowledge with

regard to asking Airman Lyon to write a statement, trial counsel's failure to object to
Prosecutor's line of questioning in this regard constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.
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ARGUMENT
I.

FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY REGARDING THE REQUISITE
MENTAL STATE REQUIRED FOR CONVICTION CONSTITUTES
MANIFEST INJUSTICE AND IS REVERSIBLE ERROR.

When the trial court failed to instruct the jury that in order to find Appellant guilty of the
crimes charged, he would have had to not only engage in the proscribed actions, but also possess
the necessary state of mind, the court committed plain error sufficient to support the overturning
of the jury verdict. Under Utah Law, "[e]very offense not involving strict liability shall require
a culpable mental state, and when the offense does not specify a culpable mental state . . . intent,
knowledge, or recklessness shall suffice to establish criminal responsibility." Utah Code Ann. §
76-2-102 (1983). Further, "a defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be innocent until
each element of the offense charged against him is proved beyond a reasonable doubt... the
words 'element of the offense' mean: (a) the conduct, attendant circumstances, or results of
conduct proscribed, prohibited or forbidden in the definition of the offense; (b) the culpable
mental state required." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 (1973) (emphasis added). See also
American Fork v. Carr, 970 P.2d 717, 720 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) ("When instructing the jury on
the elements of the offense, the trial court must specifically instruct the jury regarding the
'culpable mental state required' to commit the offense.").
Jury instructions are deficient when a court fails to instruct on all the elements of a crime,
including defining the requisite mental state required to find the defendant guilty of the crimes
charged. In reviewing the jury instructions on elements of a crime of a trial court, this Court
should apply a correctness standard. State v. Stephenson, 884 P.2d 1287, 1290 (Utah Ct. App.
1994). While Utah R. Crim. P. 19 (c) prohibits review of jury instructions that were not
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objected to at trial absent a showing of 'manifest injustice1, u[f]ailure to give an elements
instruction for a crime satisfies the manifest injustice standard under Rule 19 (c) and constitutes
reversible error as a matter of law." State v. Gibson, 908 P.2d 352, 354 (Utah Ct. App. 1995),
(quoting State v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Utah 1991)). When reviewing the jury instructions
at issue here in this light, it is clear that the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury and the
resulting manifest injustice entitles Appellant to a reversal of his convictions.
a.

The Trial Court Committed Reversible Error When it Failed to
Include Instructions Defining the Mental state Required Under
Tampering With a Witness.

Appellant was convicted of violating Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508 (witness tampering).
An examination of this statute in conjunction with the jury instructions clearly establishes a
failure on the part of the trial court to adequately instruct the jury regarding the requisite mental
state. Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508 states in pertinent part, "a person is guilty of a third degree
felony if, believing that an official proceeding or investigation is pending or about to be
instituted, he attempts to induce or otherwise cause a person to: (a) testify or inform falsely; (b)
withhold any testimony, information, document or item . . ." Id. According to Instruction No.
29 of the instructions submitted to the jury by the trial court2, in order to find Appellant guilty of
the crime of tampering with a witness, the jury must find all of the following elements, "1. That
on or about May 15, 2000, in Davis County, State of Utah: 2. The Defendant Stephen Lamar
Geukgeuzian, believing an official proceeding or investigation is pending or about to be
instituted; 3. Attempted to induce or other [sic] cause a person to: a. Testify or inform falsely; or
b. Withhold any testimony, information, document, or item." (R. 00061). While the language of
1

The failure of trial counsel to object to the jury instructions as proposed by the court will be discussed more fully
in Appellant's arguments regarding ineffective assistance of counsel.
" A true and correct copy of the jury instructions has been provided in the Addendum.
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the instruction seems to track the language of the statute, there is no further explanation
regarding the culpable mental state required for a conviction in this or any other instruction
submitted. The failure of the trial court to provide such an explanation is reversible error.
In making a determination of guilt regarding tampering with a witness, there are in reality
two mental states that must be evaluated. The first is whether the person charged, "believfed]
that an official proceeding or investigation is pending or about to be instituted . . ." Utah Code
Ann. § 76-8-508 (1). The law with regard to the requisite mental state attached to this portion of
the statute is clear, "the statute requires no more than a defendant believe an official proceeding
or investigation to be underway." State v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 874, 876-77 (Utah 1985) (emphasis
in original).
Where a statute does not specifically identify a culpable mental state, "intent, knowledge,
or recklessness shall suffice to establish criminal responsibility." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102
(1983). Thus, there must be some level of knowledge, intent3, or recklessness on the part of the
Appellant with regard to the falsity of the testimony or information by which he allegedly
attempted to induce or otherwise caused a person to act or refrain from acting. In determining
which of these mental states apply to the witness tampering statute, Utah courts have established
that, to be convicted of tampering with a witness, a defendant must "knowingly and intentionally
[attempt] to induce or otherwise cause another person to [testify or inform falsely; or] withhold
any testimony, information, document, or thing." State v. Tolman, 775 P.2d 422, 424 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989) (emphasis added). See also Sate v. Danker, 599 P.2d 518, 519 (Utah 1979) (noting
that to be found guilty of witness tampering defendant would have to know her daughter would
be a witness in a subsequent proceeding; and that she told her daughter not to testify). However,
J

Although Instruction No. 34 does define "intentionally," it is of little or no use to the jury as it is not explained to
which Instruction or portion thereof this definition applies.

8

Instruction No. 29 merely states in pertinent part, "attempted to induce or other cause a
person to: a. Testify or inform falsely; or b. Withhold any testimony, information, document, or
item." There is no language in Instruction No. 29, or anywhere else in the Jury Instructions,
delineating what mental state the defendant must possess to support a conviction of attempting to
induce or cause a person to inform falsely.
Further instruction as to the proper mental state to apply in this regard can be gleaned
from the Legislature's use of the word attempt in as an element in the witness tampering statute.
Like any attempted crime, the requisite mental state to be applied with regard to witness
tampering should be the same—namely, a specific intent to induce the identified acts. See e.g.,
State v. Vigil, 842 P.2d 843, 847 (Utah 1992) (noting historical position of the Court that an
attempt to commit a crime is an act done with the intent to commit that crime). Thus, to be
found guilty of attempting to induce the acts identified in the statute, Appellant must have
intended to induce a person to testify falsely or withhold any testimony, information, document,
or item to meet the elements of attempting to induce these acts.
The trial court, however, failed to supply any instructions with regard to the mental state
which the law required the defendant to possess in order to convict Appellant. Such a failure is
reversible error. The standard here is not whether the jury correctly applied the proper culpable
mental state, but rather, whether the court "properly instructed] the jury on the elements of the
offense charged." American Fork, 970 P.2d at 720. As the court failed to instruct the jury
regarding whether Appellant intentionally and knowingly induced a person to testify or inform
falsely, the jury instructions are deficient and Appellant's conviction must be reversed and
remanded for a new trial.
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b.

The Trial Court Committed Reversible Error When it Failed to
Properly State the Law Regarding False Written Statement and
Failed to Define the Mental State of "Knowing."

Appellant was also convicted of violating Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-504 (written false
statement). A review of the Instructions provided by the trial court in regards to this charge
clearly establishes manifest injustice and represents reversible error. The statutory definition of
false written statement provides in pertinent part, "with the intent to deceive a public servant in
the performance of his official function, he: (a) makes any written statement which he does not
believe to be true; or . . . (c) submits or invites reliance on any writing which he knows to be
lacking in authenticity." Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-504 (2). The corresponding jury instruction
given by the trial court indicated that in order to find defendant guilty, defendant, "intending to
deceive a public servant in the performance of his official function; a. Made or caused to be
made a written false statement which defendant did not believe to be true; or b. Submitted or
invited reliance upon a writing which defendant knew to be lacking in authenticity." See Jury
Instruction No. 30 (emphasis added). Although the phrase "or caused to be made" is not part of
the criminal statute, the trial court did incorporate the phrase into Instruction No. 30. (R.00062).
By adding the terms "or caused to be made" the court impermissibly expanded the scope of this
statute and the error is not cured when examining the instructions as a whole. See State v.
Johnson, 11A P.2d 1141, 1146 (Utah 1989) (jury instructions must be read and evaluated as a
whole).
A challenge to a jury instruction as incorrectly stating the law presents a question of law,
which is reviewed for correctness. See e.g., State v. Lucero, 866 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah Ct. App. 1993);
State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232, 1244 (1993), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 979 (1993). In this
matter, no evidence was before the court to support an allegation that Appellant made a false
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written statement. Rather, the evidence presented dealt with a statement submitted by Airman
Lyons. As a result, the additional language added by the court in Instruction No. 30
impermissibly expands the scope of the statute by inferring that Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-504
(2)(a) would include a written false statement of a third party which was made at the request of
Appellant. However, under the plain language of the statute, Subsection (2)(a) only applies to
false written statements made by the defendant. See State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah
1993) (holding the correct interpretation of a statute as contained injury instructions must first
be reviewed in light of the plain language of the statute). The language of the instruction created
a likelihood of confusion on the part of the jury such that by asking Lyons to make a written
statement, which Appellant did not believe to be true, he could be convicted under Subsection
(2)(a). Clearly, the legislature, through the plain language of the statute, intended subsection
(2)(a) to apply only to written statements made by the defendant himself. Conversely,
Subsection (2)(c) was intended to cover writings not made by the defendant but which defendant
invited reliance on. By adding the words "caused to be made" to the instructions, the court has
effectively hybridized the two subsections creating a catchall instruction. This hybrid instruction
allows and invites the jury to disregard the requirement of Subsection (2)(c) that defendant know
the writing lacks authenticity. The instruction also confuses truth or veracity, which is the focus
of Subsection (2)(a), with authenticity, which is the focus of Subsection (2)(c). The prejudice
suffered by Appellant as a result of this hybridization is further exacerbated by the trial court's
failure to include an instruction regarding a "knowing" mental state. As a result, the trial court's
expansion of the scope of subsection (2)(a) created an obvious incorrect statement of the law and
this statement affected the substantial rights of the Appellant.
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Even assuming, arguendo, that the misstatements of Instruction No. 30 (2) (a) could be
cured by the correct language of Instruction No. 30 (2) (b), the failure of the court to instruct the
jury with regards to the elements of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-504 (2) (c) once again results in
manifest injustice and reversible error. A critical element of subsection (2) (c) is that the
defendant knew that the writing upon which he invited reliance upon was lacking in authenticity.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103 (2) defines knowingly as being "aware of the nature of his conduct
or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a
result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result."
Id. The jury instructions given by the trial court contain no instructions regarding the mental
state necessary to find that Appellant acted with the knowledge sufficient to find him guilty
under Instruction No. 30 (2)(b). As a result, the instructions are incomplete as the trial court
failed to instruct the jury as to each element of the crime charged. As discussed in detail supra,
"[f]ailure to give an elements instruction for a crime satisfies the manifest injustice standard
under Rule 19 (c) and constitutes reversible error as a matter of law." Gibson, 908 P.2d at 354
(citation omitted). As a result, the instructions given regarding false written statement are also
fatally flawed and Appellant is entitled to a reversal of his conviction.
In sum, the jury instructions submitted to the jury by the trial court are sufficiently
problematic so as to establish manifest injustice and entitle Appellant to a remand for a new trial.
The instructions contained misstatements of the law, which mislead the jury and allowed them to
make impermissible assumptions regarding the level of culpability required for a conviction.
More damaging to the substantial rights of the Appellant is the trial court's failure to instruct on
all the elements of the crimes charged, including the necessary mens rea to sustain a conviction.
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As a result of these obvious errors, Appellant was denied his right to a fair trial and his
convictions must be reversed.
II.

TRIAL COUNSEL'S PERFORMANCE FELL BELOW AN OBJECTIVE
STANDARD OF REASONABLENESS AND AS A RESULT THE
OUTCOME OF THE TRIAL WAS PREJUDICED.

By failing to object to the State's questioning of its witness and failing to object to jury
instructions, which clearly and obviously incorrectly defined the law and failed to instruct as to
the elements necessary to obtain a conviction, trial counsel's performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness. Such errors prejudiced the Appellant and deprived him of a fair trial.
The United States Supreme Court has established a two-part test to determine whether a
defendant was deprived of his Constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel.
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient.
This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was
not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's
errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial
whose result is reliable.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). This test for determining the adequacy of
trial counsel has been embraced and applied by Utah courts. See e.g., State v. Templin, 805 P.2d
182, 186 (Utah 1990). Despite the presumption of competence as expressed in Strickland and its
progeny, Utah courts have continually noted that appellate courts "must review each case
carefully to prevent the infrequent meritorious claim from being reflexively swept into the tide of
affirmance by the chronicles of probability." State v. Moritzsky, 111 P.2d 688, 690 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989). Rather, the appellate court must not "mechanically apply the two-part standard .. .
but instead . . . 'focus upon the fundamental fairness of the proceeding challenged. The purpose
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of the inquiry is simply to insure that the defendant receives a fair trial.'" Id. (quoting State v.
Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986).
'The prejudice test for ineffective assistance of counsel claims is equivalent to the
harmfulness test applied in assessing plain error." State v. Parker, 4 P.3d 778, 780 (Utah 2000).
To show ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
(i) identify specific acts or omissions that fall below the standard of
reasonable professional assistance when considered at the time of the act or
omission and under all attendant circumstances, and (ii) demonstrate that
counsel's error prejudiced the defendant, i.e., that but for the error, there is a
reasonable probability that the verdict would have been more favorable to
the defendant.
Id. at 781-82 (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1225 (Utah 1993)). When viewed in this
light, the record shows that the performance of Appellant's trial counsel not only falls below an
objective level of reasonableness, but also that there is a reasonable likelihood that the result of
the trial would have been different but for the ineffective assistance.
a.

Trial Counsel's Failure to Object to the Jury Instructions as Presented by the
Trial Court Constituted Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.

As noted above, the jury instructions submitted by the court were seriously deficient in
several ways. Trial counsel had access to these instructions for review before they were
submitted to the jury. Likewise, trial counsel was present in court as the instructions were read
aloud to the jury. Yet at no time did trial counsel object to the lack of mens rea instructions or
the misstatement of the law as found in Instruction No. 30. An objection to the language of the
jury instructions would have been made outside the presence of the jury. Thus, no possible
prejudice would have inured to the defendant had such an objection been made. As a result,
there is no rational explanation or tactical reason for trial counsel's failure to object to the
language of the Instructions. Where no possible explanation or tactical reason exists for such a
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decision, Utah courts have held that the first part of the Strickland test has been met. See e.g.,
State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 188 (Utah 1990); State v. Maestas, 984 P.2d 376, 381 (Utah
1999).
The court must then look to the second prong of the Strickland test, the prejudice to the
Appellant. Objecting to the jury instructions would have ensured that the mens rea requirements
of both Instruction No. 29 and Instruction No. 30 restricted the jurors to considering the proper
elements of the crimes charged. As a result of trial counsel's errors, however, jurors were free to
insert whatever standard of culpability they wished, rather than applying the proper standards as
required by law. Thus, it is impossible to determine on the basis of the record whether the jury
applied the evidence to each element that the prosecution was required to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt. Where this Court cannot determine from the record whether the proper
elements were considered, there is a reasonable probability of a different result. See State v.
Callahan, 866 P.2d 590, 595 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); see also State v. Finlayson, 994 P.2d 1243,
1249 (Utah 2000) (failure to object to jury instructions which identified incorrect elements of
crime sufficient to establish prejudice under Strickland). As a result of trial counsel's clear
failure to provide effective assistance and the prejudice suffered by Appellant as a result of
counsel's failure to object to the jury instructions, Appellant is entitled to a reversal of his
convictions.
b.

Trial Counsel's Failure to Object to Prosecutor's Line of Questioning to
Airman Lyon Regarding Appellant's Knowledge Constituted Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel.

During the Prosecutor's direct questioning of Airman Lyon, the prosecutor asked Airman
Lyon, "Going back to when you heard the threats and the things that you made statements about,
was Steven aware that you were around when you made those statements?" (R. 00141: 31, lines
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18-20.) To which Airman Lyon responded, "yes, sir." (R. 00141: 31, line 21.) The Prosecutor
followed, " and so he would, and so he, when he asked you, as far as your concerned when he
asked you to write this statement he was asking you to write something that he knew was false."
R. 00141: 31, lines 22-24.) To which Airman Lyon responded, "yes, sir." (R. 00141: 31, line
25.) At no time during this exchange did trial counsel object to the line of questioning, either on
grounds of foundation, or testifying by the prosecuting attorney. As a result, the jury was
allowed to hear, and consider without a curative instruction, a statement attributing a state of
mind to the defendant, which was supported by no other evidence before the court.
Utah R. Evid. 602 states " a witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is
introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter."
Id. No evidence was introduced to support a contention to the effect that Airman Lyon had any
personal knowledge whatsoever regarding whether Appellant was aware Airman Lyon was
around when Appellant allegedly made threatening statements about his wife. Nor was there any
evidence introduced to the establish the personal knowledge of Airman Lyon that Appellant was
asking him to "write something that he knew was false." The fact that trial counsel failed to
object to such a clear violation of the Utah Rules of Evidence is sufficient to satisfy the first
prong of the Strickland test. See e.g., Callahan, 866 P.2d at 595 (failure of counsel to object to
prosecutor's questioning in trial likely fails to meet the standard of reasonable representation).
When viewed in light of all attendant circumstances, trial counsel's failure to object to
this line of questioning clearly resulted in significant prejudice to Appellant. Throughout this
brief, Appellant has maintained and established that the failure to instruct the jury as to the
elements of the crimes charged has resulted in prejudice to the Appellant. While the failure to
object to a line of questioning may be sustained under other circumstances as a "reasonable trial
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strategy", under the attendant circumstances in this matter, trial counsel's error clearly affected
the ability of the jury to reach a trustworthy verdict. See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1225.
The key issue at trial was whether Appellant knowingly induced a person to testify or
inform falsely under Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508 and whether Appellant knowingly submitted or
invited reliance upon a writing, which he knew to be lacking in authenticity under Utah Code
Ann. § 76-8-504. By failing to object to the identified line of questioning, the danger of the jury
misapplying the facts to the elements of the crimes charged was exacerbated to an unacceptable
level. Had trial counsel objected to this line of questioning, it is unlikely that the jury would
have reached a verdict based on Airman Lyon's testimony that he never told Appellant that the
statement was untrue and Appellant's testimony the he never asked Lyon to do or say anything
which Appellant believed to be untrue. By failing to object to the inaccurate and incomplete jury
instructions, in conjunction with a failure to object to a line of questioning where the witness was
invited to speculate as to Appellant's knowledge at the time the writings were made, trial counsel
created a situation where the jury verdict is suspect and, but for these errors, the outcome of the
trial would likely be different.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests this Court reverse the convictions
of the lower court and remand for a new trial.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / l * d a y of August 2001.

)LOUUL^(

X^W^_

Kendall S. Peterson
Jerald V. Hale
Attorneys for Appellant
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UT Code § 76-8-508, Tampering with witness--Retaliation against
witness or informant--Bribery--Communicating a threat.
document, or item;

Utah Code § 76-8-508

(c) elude legal process summoning him to
provide evidence; or

WEST'S UTAH CODE
TITLE 76. CRIMINAL CODE
CHAPTER 8. OFFENSES
AGAINST THE
ADMINISTRATION OF
GOVERNMENT
PART 5. FALSIFICATION IN
OFFICIAL MATTERS

(d) absent himself from any proceeding or
investigation to which he has been summoned.
(2) A person is guilty of a third degree felony if
he:
(a) commits any unlawful act in retaliation for
anything done by another as a witness or
informant;

Current through End of 2000 General
Sess.

(b) solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any
benefit in consideration of his doing any of the
acts specified under Subsection (1); or

§ 76-8-508. Tampering with witnessRetaliation
against
witness
or
informant—Bribery—Communicating
a threat.

(c) communicates to a person a threat that a
reasonable person would believe to be a threat to
do bodily injury to the person, because of any act
performed or to be performed by the person in his
capacity as a witness or informant in an official
proceeding or investigation.

(1) A person is guilty of a third degree felony if,
believing that an official proceeding or
investigation is pending or about to be instituted,
he attempts to induce or otherwise cause a person
to:

As last amended by Chapter 175, Laws of Utah 1988; Laws
2000, c. 1, § 115, ejf.May 1, 2000.

(a) testify or inform falsely;
(b) withhold

any testimony,

Page 1

information.

Search this disc for cases citing this section.

Copyright (c) West Group 2001 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works
a

Page 1

UT Code § 76-8-504, Written false statement
Utah Code § 76-8-504

(b) Knowingly creates a false impression in a
written application for any pecuniary or other
benefit by omitting information necessary to
prevent statements therein from being misleading;
or

WEST'S UTAH CODE
TITLE 76. CRIMINAL CODE
CHAPTER 8. OFFENSES
AGAINST THE
ADMINISTRATION OF
GOVERNMENT
PARTS. FALSIFICATION IN
OFFICIAL MATTERS

(c) Submits or invites reliance on any writing
which he knows to be lacking in authenticity; or
(d) Submits or invites reliance on any sample,
specimen, map, boundary mark, or other object
which he knows to be false.

(Information regarding effective
dates, repeals, etc. is provided
subsequently in this document.)

(3) No person shall be guilty under this section
if he retracts the falsification before it becomes
manifest that the falsification was or would be
exposed.

Current through End of 2000 General
Sess.

As enacted by Chapter 196, Laws of Utah 1973.

§ 76-8-504. Written false statement

WEST'S UTAH CODE

A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if:

TITLE 76. CRIMINAL CODE

(1) He makes a written false statement which he
does not believe to be true on or pursuant to a
form bearing a notification authorized by law to
the effect that false statements made therein are
punishable; or

CHAPTER 8. OFFENSES
AGAINST THE
ADMINISTRATION OF
GOVERNMENT

(2) With intent to deceive a public servant in
the performance of his official function, he:

PART 5. FALSIFICATION IN
OFFICIAL MATTERS

(a) Makes any written false statement which he
does not believe to be true; or

Search this disc for cases citing this section.
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RCRP Rule 19, RULE 19. INSTRUCTIONS

(b) Upon each written request so presented and
given, or refused, the court shall endorse its
decision and shall initial or sign it. If part be
given and part refused, the court shall distinguish,
showing by the endorsement what part of the
charge was given and what part was refused.

*374 Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule
19

WEST'S UTAH RULES OF
COURT
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE

(c) No party may assign as error any portion of
the charge or omission therefrom unless he objects
thereto before the jury is instructed, stating
distinctly the matter to which he objects and the
ground of his objection. Notwithstanding a party's
failure to object, error may be assigned to
instructions in order to avoid a manifest injustice.

Current with amendments received
through JO-J-2000.

RULE 19. INSTRUCTIONS
(a) At the close of the evidence or at such earlier
time as the court reasonably directs, any party may
file written request that the court instruct the jury
on the law as set forth in the request. At the same
time copies of such requests shall be furnished to
the other parties. The court shall inform counsel
of its proposed action upon the request; and it
shall furnish counsel with a copy of its proposed
instructions, unless the parties stipulate that such
instructions may be given orally, or otherwise
waive this requirement.

(d) The court shall not comment on the evidence
in the case, and if the court refers to any of the
evidence, it shall instruct the jury7 that they are the
exclusive judges of all questions of fact.
(e) Arguments of the respective parties shall be
made after the court has instructed the jury.
Unless otherwise provided by law, any limitation
upon time for argument shall be within the
discretion of the court.
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNT*'
STATE OF UTAH, FARMNGTON DEPARTMENT

STATE OF UTAH,

JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Plaintiff,

Case No. 001700592
Judge: MICHAEL G. ALLPHIN

vs.
STEPHEN LAMAR GEUKGEUZIAN,
Defendant.

Ladies and Gentlemen: Attached hereto are instructions numbered one through
twenty-seven, given to you at the beginning of the trial. Additional instructions numbered 28
through

O /

will be included at a later time in the proceedings. Taken together, these

instructions govern your conduct and deliberations during the trial of this case and must be
carefully followed.
Dated this 3-

day of _

, 2000.
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JURY INSTRUCTIONS

1.

GENERAL INSTRUCTION

There are certain laws and rules which apply to this case. I'll explain them to you from time
to time during the trial. Please pay careful attention. Each of you has been given a copy of these
instructions. This copy is yours to keep. As I read these instructions to you, please follow along on
your copy. Keep in mind the following points:
Many Instructions. There will be many instructions. All are equally important. Don't pick
out one and ignore the rest. Think about each instruction in the context of all the others.
Obey Instructions. You must obey the instructions. You are not allowed to reach decisions
that go against the law.
Gender - Singular/Plural. In these instructions, the masculine gender such as "he" or
him"includes the feminine "she" or "her" and the singular such as "defendant" includes the
plural "defendants" when appropriate.
,f

Note Taking. You may take notes during the trial, but don't over do it, and don't let it
distract you from following the evidence. The use of notes in the jury room to refresh your
memory is perfectly acceptable. But let me caution you not to rely excessively upon your
notes. The lawyers will review important evidence in their closing arguments and help you
focus on that which is most relevant to your decision. I also caution that notes are not
evidence. Use them only to aid personal memory or concentration. One juror's opinion
should not be given excessive consideration solely because that juror has taken notes.
Keep an Open Mind. Don't form an opinion about the ultimate issues in this case until you
have listened to all the evidence and the lawyers' summaries, along with the instructions on
the law. Keep an open mind until then.

2.

WHAT RULES APPLY TO RECESSES

From time to time I will call for a recess. It may be for a few minutes, a lunch break,
overnight or longer. During recesses, do not talk about this case with anyone; not family, friends
or even each other. The Clerk may ask you to wear a badge identifying yourself as a juror so that
people will not try to discuss the case with you. Don't mingle with the lawyers, the parties, the
witnesses or anyone else connected with the case. You may say "hello", or exchange similar
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greetings or civilities with these persons, but don't engage in conversations. Don't accept from or
give to any of these persons any favors, however slight, such as rides or food. Finally, don't read
about this case in the newspaper or listen to or watch any reports on television or radio. These
constraints are necessary for a fair trial.

3.

THE GENERAL ROLE OF THE JUDGE, THE JURY AND THE LAWYERS

The judge, the jury and the lawyers are all officers of the Court and play important roles in
the trial.
Judge. It is my role as judge to decide all legal issues, supervise the trial and instruct the
jury on the LAW that it must apply.
Jury. It is your role as the jury to follow that law and decide the factual issues. Factual
issues generally relate to WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, HOW or similar things
concerning which evidence will be presented.
Lawyers. It is the role of the lawyers to present evidence, generally by calling and
questioning witnesses and presenting exhibits. Each lawyer will also tryto persuade you to
accept his version of the facts and to decide the case in favor of his client.
Keep in mind that neither the lawyers nor I actually decide the case, because that is your role.
Don't be influenced by what you think our personal opinions are; rather, you decide the case based
upon the law explained in these instructions and the evidence presented in court.

4.

OUTLINE OF THE TRIAL

The trial will generally proceed as follows:
Opening Statements. The lawyers will outline what the case is about and indicate what
they think the evidence will show.
Presentation of Evidence. The plaintiff will offer its evidence first followed by the
defendant. Each side may also offer rebuttal evidence after hearing the witnesses and
seeing the exhibits offered by the other side.
Instructions on the Law. After each side has presented its evidence, I will supplement
these written instructions and review them with you.
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Closing Arguments. The lawyers will then summarize and argue the case. They will
share with you their respective views of the evidence, how it relates to the law and how
they think you should decide the case.
Jury Deliberation. The final step is for you to retire to the jury room and deliberate
until you reach a verdict.

5.

THE CHARGE and THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
The defendant in this case has been accused of committing a crime. The
accusation is in a written document called an INFORMATION, which will be read or
summarized for you following this instruction. As you listen, keep in mind that the
defendant has answered the charge by saying "not guilty." The defendant is presumed to
be innocent of the charge.

[THE INFORMATION WILL NOW BE READ TO THE JURY]
COUNT 1
TAMPERING WITH A WITNESS, as follows: That on or about May 15, 2000, at the
place aforesaid, the defendant believing that an official proceeding or investigation is pending or
about to be instituted, attempted to induce or otherwise cause a person to: testify or inform
falsely; or withhold any testimony, information, document, item.
COUNT 2
WRITTEN FALSE STATMENT, as follows: That on or about May 18, 2000, at the place
aforesaid, the defendant intending to deceive a public servant in the performance of his official
function, made or caused to be made a written false statement which defendant did not believe to
be true, knowingly created a false impression in a written application for a pecuniary or other
benefit by omitting information necessary to prevent statements therein from being misleading or
submitted or invited reliance upon a writing which defendant knew to be lacking in authenticity,
or upon a sample, map, boundary mark, or other object which he knew to be false.

6.

WHAT IS THE JURY'S ROLE IN THIS CASE?

You must decide whether the charge against the defendant has been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. Your decision is called a VERDICT. Your verdict must be based only on the
evidence produced here in court. It must be based on facts, not on speculation. Don't guess about
any fact. However, you may draw reasonable inferences or arrive at reasonable conclusions
from the evidence presented.
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7.

WHAT IS EVIDENCE?

Evidence is anything that tends to prove or disprove the existence of a disputed fact. It
can be testimony, or documents, or objects, or photographs, or stipulations, or certain qualified
opinions, or any combination of these things. Sometimes the lawyers may agree that certain
facts exist. You should accept any agreed or stipulated facts as having been proved. In limited
instances, I may take "judicial notice" of a well-known fact. If this happens, I will explain how
you should treat it.
Two classes of evidence are recognized and admitted in courts of law, upon either or both
of which a jury may lawfully base its findings, whether favorable to the State or to the defendant.
One type of evidence is known as direct and the other as circumstantial. The law makes
no distinction between the two classes as to the degree of proof required for conviction or as to
their effectiveness in defendant's favor, but respects each for such convincing force as it may
carry and accepts each as a reasonable method of proof.
Direct evidence of a person's conduct at any time in question consists of the testimony of
every witness who, with any of his own physical senses, perceived such conduct or any part
thereof, and which testimony describes or relates what thus was perceived. All other evidence
admitted in the trial is circumstantial in relation to such conduct, and, insofar as it shows any act,
statement or other conduct, or any circumstances of fact, tending to prove by reasonable
inference the innocense or guilt of the defendant, it may be considered by you in arriving at a
verdict.

8-

OPINION TESTIMONY

Under certain circumstances, witnesses are allowed to express an opinion. A person who
by education, study or experience has become an expert in any art, science or profession, may
give his opinion and the reason for it. A layman (or, a non-expert) is also allowed to express an
opinion if it is based on personal observations and it is helpful to understanding his testimony or
the case. You are not bound to believe anyone's opinion. Consider it as you would any other
evidence, and give it the weight you think it deserves.

9.

WHAT IS NOT TO BE CONSIDERED OR USED AS EVIDENCE?

I've explained to you what evidence is. Now I'll tell you about some things which do not
qualify as evidence or which, for some other good reason, you should not consider in reaching
your verdict.
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Accusation. The fact that formal charges have been filed accusing the defendant of
committing a crime is not evidence of guilt. The defendant is a competent witness in the
defendant's own behalf, and the fact that the defendant is charged with the commission of
a crime should not be regarded by you as tending to impeach or discredit the defendant's
testimony.
Punishment. You may be aware of the gravity of the offense charged and the range of
potential penalties, but you should not consider what actual punishment the defendant
may receive if found guilty. That is for the judge to decide based upon the applicable law.
Right to Remain Silent. If the defendant chooses not to testify in this case, don't consider
that as evidence of guilt. The Constitution provides that an accused person has the right
not to testify and you should not draw any negative inferences based upon the reliance on
this right.
Lawyer Statements. What the lawyers say is not evidence. Their purpose is to give you a
preview of expected evidence and to help you understand the evidence from their
viewpoint.
Personal Investigation. Evidence is not what you can find out on your own. You should
not make any investigation about the facts in this case. Do not make personal inspections,
observations or experiments. Do not view premises, things or articles not produced in
court. Don't let anyone else do anything like this for you. Don't look for information in
law books, dictionaries or public or private records which are not produced in court.
Out of Court Information. Do not consider anything you may have heard or read about
this case in the media or by word of mouth or other out-of-court communication. You
must rely solely on the evidence that is produced and received in court.

10.

THE JUDGE DECIDES WHAT EVIDENCE IS ADMISSIBLE

Sometimes a question will be raised about whether certain evidence is proper for the jury
to consider. This type of question is called an OBJECTION. I rule on objections. If an objection
is SUSTAINED the evidence is kept out and you should not consider it. If an objection is
OVERRULED the evidence comes in and you may consider it. If evidence is STRICKEN you
should ignore it.

[OPENING STATEMENTS BY COUNSEL]
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11.

HOW TO MAKE DECISIONS ABOUT THE EVIDENCE

Once evidence is admitted, you must decide three things about it: Whether it should be
believed, how important it is, and what you can infer or conclude from it.
Use your common sense as a reasonable person in making these decisions. Review all the
evidence. Donft imagine things which have no evidence to back them up. Consider the evidence
fairly without any bias or sympathy toward either side.

12.

DECIDING WHETHER TO BELIEVE A WITNESS

As each witness testifies, you must decide how accurate that testimony is. It may help
you to ask yourself questions such as these:
Personal Interest. Does the witness have a personal interest in how the trial comes out?
Other Bias. Does the witness have some other bias or motive to testify a certain way?
Demeanor:
What impression is made by the witness's appearance and conduct while
answering questions?
Consistency. Did the witness make conflicting statements or contradict other evidence?
Knowledge and Memory. Did the witness have a good opportunity to know the facts and
the ability to remember them?
Reasonableness. Is the testimony reasonable in light of human experience?
You're not required to believe all that a witness says. You are entitled to believe one
witness as against many or many as against one, in accordance with your honest convictions.

13.

WHAT IF A WITNESS PURPOSELY GIVES FALSE TESTIMONY?

If you believe a witness has purposely given false testimony about anything relevant to
the case, you may disregard not only the false testimony but the remaining testimony from that
witness unless it is corroborated by other evidence; in which event you should give it what
weight you think it deserves.
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14.

WHO IS RESPONSIBLE TO CONVINCE THE JURY?

The prosecution has the burden of proof. It is the one making the accusations in this case.
The defendant is not required to prove innocence - you must start by assuming it. According to
our law, the defendant is presumed to be innocent unless proven guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. This is a humane provision of the law intended to guard against the danger of an innocent
person being unjustly punished.

15.

HOW CONVINCED MUST THE JURY BE BEFORE DECIDING THE
DEFENDANT IS GUILTY?

Before you can give up your assumption that the defendant is innocent, you must be
convinced that the defendant's guilt has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof beyond a
reasonable doubt is that degree of proof which satisfies the mind and convinces the
understanding of reasonable persons who are bound to act conscientiously upon it.

16.

WHAT IS A REASONABLE DOUBT?

A reasonable doubt is one based upon reason and common sense rather than speculation,
supposition, emotion or sympathy. It is the kind of doubt that would make a reasonable person
hesitate to act. It must be real and not merely imaginary. It is such as would be retained by
reasonable men and women after a full and impartial consideration of all the evidence, and must
arise from the evidence or lack of evidence in the case.

17.

HOW TO EVALUATE DOUBT

If after such full and impartial consideration some possible doubt exists, you must
determine whether such doubt is reasonable in light of all the evidence. Ask yourselves if the
doubt is consistent with reason and common sense. The law does not require that the evidence
dispel all possible or conceivable doubt, but rather that it dispel all reasonable doubt. That is
what is meant by the phrase "proof beyond a reasonable doubt".

OPe/Uli/l^ Stub"* eJ%
[THE EVIDENCE WILL NOW BE PRESENTED]
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18.

INSTRUCTIONS ON THE LAW THAT APPLIES TO THIS CASE

The clerk has attached to your copy of these instructions some additional pages which
contain instructions relating to the particular laws or rules that apply in this case. These
additional instructions begin with instruction number twenty-eight (28). We will read those after
completing our review of the following instructions which relate essentially to the procedure that
you should follow.

19.

THE JUDGE IS IMPARTIAL

The Constitution and the laws of this state absolutely prohibit the trial judge from making
any comment about the witnesses or the evidence and I am not in any way permitted to assist you
in determining what is or is not the truth in this case.
Therefore, you are instructed that if during the trial I have said or done anything which
has suggested to you that I am inclined to favor the claim or position of either party, you are not
to permit yourselves to be influenced by any such suggestion.
I have not intended to indicate any opinion as to which witnesses are, or are not, worthy
of belief, nor which party should prevail. If any expression of mine has seemed to indicate an
opinion relative to any of these matters, you should disregard it, because you are the sole and
only judges of the facts.

20.

WHAT TO TAKE WITH YOU INTO THE JURY ROOM

You may take the following things with you when you go into the jury room to discuss
this case:
a.

all exhibits admitted in evidence;

b.

your notes (if any);

c.

your copy of these instructions; and

d.

the verdict form or forms.
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21.

WHAT TO DO IN THE JURY ROOM

The first thing you should do in the jury room is choose a person to be in charge. This
person is called the "Foreperson" or the "Chair." The Chair's duties are:
a.

To keep order and allow everyone a chance to speak;

b.

To represent the jury in any communications you make; and

c.

to sign your verdict and bring it back in court.

In deciding what the verdict should be, all jurors are equal. The Chair has no more power
than any other juror.

22.

CONSIDER EACH OTHERS OPINION, THEN REACH YOUR OWN
DECISION BASED UPON HONEST DELIBERATION

It is rarely productive or good for a juror, upon entering the jury room, to make an
emphatic expression of opinion or to announce a determination to stand for a certain verdict.
When that is done at the outset, a person's sense of pride may block appropriate consideration of
the case. Use your common memory, your common understanding and your common sense. Talk
about the case with each other as you ponder and deliberate.
Your verdict must be your own. Don't make a decision just to agree with everyone else.
However, you should respect and consider the opinions of the other jurors. If you are persuaded
that a decision you initially made was wrong, don't hesitate to change your mind. Help each other
arrive at the truth. Also, don't resort to chance or some form of decision-making other than
honest deliberation.

23.

WHAT TO DO IF YOU HAVE QUESTIONS DURING DELIBERATION

If you think you need more information or a clarification, write a note and give it to the
bailiff. I will review it with the lawyers. We will answer your question whenever appropriate.
However, these instructions should contain all the information you need to reach a verdict based
upon the evidence.

24.

FOCUS ON THIS CASE ALONE

Your duty is to decide this case and this case alone. You should not use this case as a
forum for correcting perceived wrongs in other cases, or as a means of expressing individual or
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collective views about anything other than the guilt or innocence of this defendant. Your verdict
should reflect the facts as found by you applied to the law as explained in these instructions and
should not be distorted by any outside factors or objectives.
The final test of the quality of your service will be the verdict you return. You will
contribute to efficient judicial administration if you focus exclusively on this case and return a
just and proper verdict.

25.

REACHING A VERDICT

This being a criminal case, your verdict must be unanimous; all jurors must agree. When
you are all in agreement, then you have reached a verdict and your work is finished.

26.

HOW TO REPORT YOUR VERDICT

When you have reached a verdict, the Chair should date and sign the verdict form which
corresponds to your decision. Then notify the bailiff that you are ready to return to court.

27.

WHAT HAPPENS AFTER THE VERDICT HAS BEEN REPORTED

After you have given your verdict to the judge, he or the clerk may ask each of you about
it to make sure you agree with it. Then you will be excused from the jury box and you may leave
at any time. You may remain in the courtroom, if you wish, to watch the rest of the proceedings,
which should be quite brief.
After you are excused, you may talk about the case with anyone. Likewise, you are not
required to talk about it. If anyone attempts to talk to you about the case when you don't want to
do that, please tell the Court Clerk.
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g.

These instructions contain the law that governs you in this case. In determining the facts,
you may consider only the evidence given at this trial. Evidence which was rejected by me or
ordered stricken out by me may not be considered by you.
Not one of these instructions states all of the law of this case, but all of them must be
taken and considered together inasmuch as they are connected with and relate to each other.
You should not be concerned with the wisdom of any rule of law. Regardless of your
own opinion, it would be a violation of your sworn duty to base you verdict upon any other view
of the law than that given in my instructions.

a

INSTRUCTION NO

Before you can convict defendant, Stephen Lamar Geukgeuzian, of TAMPERING WITH
A WITNESS, as charged in Count 1 of the Information, you must find from the evidence beyond
a reasonable doubt, all of the following elements of the crime:
1.

That on or about May 15, 2000, in Davis County, State of Utah:

2.

The Defendant Stephen Lamar Geukguzian, believing that an official proceeding
or investigation is pending or about to be instituted;

3.

Attempted to induce or other cause a person to:
a.

Testify or inform falsely; or

b.

Withhold any testimony, information, document, or item.

If, after careful consideration of all the evidence in this case, you are convinced of the
truth of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must
find the defendant, Stephen Lamar Geukgeuzian, guilty of TAMPERING WITH A WITNESS, as
charged in Count 1 of the Information.
If, on the other hand, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are
not convinced of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then
you must find the defendant, Stephen Lamar Geukgeuzian, not guilty of TAMPERING WITH A
WITNESS, as charged in Count 1 of the Information.

INSTRUCTION NO. \)J)

Before you can convict defendant, Stephen Lamar Geukgeuzian, of FALSE WRITTEN
STATEMENT, as charged in Count 2 of the Information, you must find from the evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following elements of the crime:
1.

That on or about May l£, 2000, in Davis County, State of Utah:

2.

The Defendant Stephen Lamar Geukguzian, intending to deceive a public servant
in the performance of his official function;
a.

Made or caused to be made a written false statement which defendant did
not believe to be true; or

b.

Submitted or invited reliance upon a writing which defendant knew to be
lacking in authenticity.

If, after careful consideration of all the evidence in this case, you are convinced of the
truth of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must
find the defendant, Stephen Lamar Geukgeuzian, guilty of FALSE WRITTEN STATEMENT, as
charged in Count 2 of the Information.
If, on the other hand, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are
not convinced of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then
you must find the defendant, Stephen Lamar Geukgeuzian, not guilty of FALSE WRITTEN
STATEMENT, as charged in Count 2 of the Information.

INSTRUCTION NO.

%

No person shall be guilty of WRITTEN FALSE STATEMENT, if he retracts the
falsification before it becomes manifest that the falsification was or would be exposed.

INSTRUCTION NO. ^ 2

When it is charged that a crime was committed on or about a certain date, if the jury finds
that the crime was committed by a defendant, the proof need not show that it was committed at
the time so alleged, but may be proved to have been committed sometime on or about the date
alleged.

INSTRUCTION NO

15

A Domestic Relations Commissioner and other court personnel at a hearing regarding an
application for a protective order are public servants acting in their official function.

INSTRUCTION NO.

yJ

A person engages in conduct:
Intentionally, with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when
it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.

INSTRUCTION NO. %.

Intent, being a state of mind, is seldom susceptible of proof by direct and positive
evidence and may ordinarily be inferred from acts, conduct, statement and circumstances.

INSTRUCTION NO

3U

In arriving at a verdict in this case, you shall not discuss or consider the subject of penalty
or punishment, as that is a matter which lies with the court and other governmental agencies, and
must not in any way affect your decision as to the innocence or guilt of the defendant.

INSTRUCTION NO

n

Your verdict in this case must be in writing, signed by your foreperson and returned by
you into the court. Your verdict must be as follows:

COUNT 1
GUILTY of TAMPERING WITH A WITNESS,
OR
NOT GUILTY of TAMPERING WITH A WITNESS
COUNT2
GUILTY of WRITTEN FALSE STATEMENT
OR
NOT GUILTY of WRITTEN FALSE STATEMENT.
This being a criminal case, each and every juror is required to find a verdict of guilty. If
there is not a unanimous verdict of 'guilty' by all jurors, then you amat find the defendant

'guilty'.

See Xjvsk jft^s"

